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The Moroccan state takes a nuanced place among autocracies and democracies—the 
regime features fundamental democratic institutions and while the central power of the 
monarchy is maintained through a constellation of political, economic, social, and 
cultural institutions. In this case, David Brumberg’s classification of “liberalized 
autocracies” is useful, which defines these states as using a mixture of “guided pluralism, 
controlled elections and selective repression” to maintain and centralize power1 This 
political structure of liberalized autocracy creates sufficient political opportunity for 
various protest movements to emerge but until recently few have successfully enacted 
change. The February 20th protest movement, inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian 
example and organized on Facebook, is organizing in ways to directly confront the 
paradigm of liberalized autocracy. Their demands, which are a mixture of a call for 
universal human rights such as democracy along with answers to longstanding economic 
issues, do not adhere to any ideology and as such it has been successful in garnering 
support from all corners of Moroccan contentious politics. The movement has evolved 
fluidly through the Internet, with a loose, nonhierarchical organizational structure and a 
globally informed rhetoric that is a hallmark of Langman’s “Internetworked Social 
Movements.”2  Through its methods, organizational structure, rhetoric and actions, 
February 20th is attempting to change the political structure of Morocco and create an 
active political society. At this juncture, a few months after the beginning of the 
movement with no end in sight, a conclusion about its attainment of this goal is 
impossible. Still, two questions remain, why now and what next? The second half of this 
                                                 
1 “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” 56. 
2 “From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice.” 
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paper consists of interviews of an array of people close to the movement—an organizer, a 
government official, an activist and an academic—attempting to answer these questions. 
By analyzing the rhetoric of each of these actors and applying these existing theories, we 
can begin to see overlaps in the theory of social movements and autocratic states and 
their application. This study attempts to capture singular opinions about the February 20th 
movement and put them in dialogue with greater theories of social and political change.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As of late, there have emerged various theories and strategies on how to categorize 
regimes that are not exactly democratic while not complete autocracies. Different 
categorizations have floated around, from “democratization” to “liberalization” and even 
attempts to describe the “regressive” action of shifting towards authoritarianism. Matthjis 
Bogaards explores the distinctions between the terms are drawn among scholars, 
explaining that no consensus has been reached3 (476). Liberalization is seen as 
improvements made by authoritarian regimes, as defined by David Brumberg, and is a 
part of the larger process of democratization. Democratization can also refer “completing 
democracy” of already existing democracies by increasing freedoms.4 As Bogaards 
points out, this makes democracy a dichotomous category, a conception which has been 
used by scholars to define nations as “free,” “unfree” or occasionally “partially free.”5 
Measures of democracy, although they have their flaws, allow for a comparative analysis 
                                                 




of democratization across states and time. It also recognizes the existence of states 
between democracy and authoritarianism.  
 
Autocracy has become accepted as the de facto political structure across the Arab 
world. The Arab world include total autocracies such as Saudi Arabia that subsist on, 
according to Brumberg, oil money, “harmonic” legitimacy based on the defense of the 
unity of the Arab or Islamic nation and the enshrined hegemonic state institutions that 
repress dissent.6  More common, however, are liberalized autocracies that are the 
antithesis of total autocracies in that they do not depend on one uniting ideology, they 
allow some groups to be establish as institutions outside of the state and do not depend on 
one economic resource, class or interest. This creates dissonance in the society that 
benefits the ruling class because through this “divide and rule” strategy, the state can 
maintain it’s central power. 7 While these states may have certain facets of democracy, 
such as elections, the results always favor the rulers. The power of these states stem from 
different forms of legitimacy. Monarchies in the Arab world usually meld traditional and 
religious legitimacy, using long dynasties and ancestry from the Prophet to explain their 
power. Presidents claim legitimacy through sometimes-rigged elections or by calling off 
elections for years because of an emergency state. By allowing a strategic degree of 
openness, the state gives the appearance of representing their citizens while actually 
reinforcing their power.  
The power relationship between state and society are not static, as Brumberg 
points out, there exists “…a protracted cycle in which rulers widen or narrow the 
                                                 
6 “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” 58. 
7 Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy.” 
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boundaries of participation and expression in response to what they see as the social, 
economic, political, and geostrategic challenges facing their regimes.”8 These regimes 
must allow changes beyond their control because this extends the longevity of the regime. 
By allowing some changes they appease the people sufficiently to avoid truly threatening 
their legitimacy. This balancing act between democracy and autocracy creates space for 
some political discourse through usually not significant structural changes. Political 
opposition groups are not always openly repressed, but protesting usually amounts to 
expressing grievances while there is no structure in place to address the complaints. 
States will claim they are involved in a process of “democratic transition” when in reality 
it is “an involuted gradualism whose small steps trace the sad contours of an unvirtuous 
circle rather than the hopeful lineaments of a real path forward.”9 
The key to dismantling liberalized autocracies, Brumberg explains is opening the political 
space enough to redefine the relationship between citizen and state so that there is an 
active political society. He advocates achieving this through “a policy of democratic of 
democratic gradualism [that] must not only push for the creation of effective political 
parties, representative parliaments, and rule of law; it must also be accompanied by 
international support for effective monitoring of local and national elections.”10 By way 
of their hybridization of democratic and autocratic features, liberalized autocratic states 
can resist allowing full representation of it’s citizens, however, if Brumberg is correct, 
with the creation of an active political society, change may be possible. 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 63. 
9 Ibid., 67. 
10 Ibid. 
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Political opportunity theory posits that the ability of political activists to advance 
their claims, mobilize the population and ultimately realize their goals is explained by 
context.11 The success or emergence of a new movement cannot be explained by an 
paticular legitimacy of their claims but only the external political structure. As Meyer and 
Minkoff explain “the basic premise is that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects 
for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for 
particular strategies of influence to be exercised and for movements to affect mainstream 
institutional politics and policy.”12 This is an admittedly broad theory whose problems 
have been discussed extensively by Meyer, 13 although it remains useful by providing a 
framework which to explain political mobilizations. The two founders of the theory, Tilly 
and Eisinger, proposed a curvilinear relationship between political openness and protests. 
Meyer summarizes this view as “protest occurs when there is a space of toleration by a 
polity and when claimants are neither sufficiently advantaged to obviate the need to use 
dramatic means to express their interests nor so completely repressed to prevent them 
from trying to get what they want.”14 Simply put, there must be enough freedom to 
protest without fear of violent repression but, obviously there must be enough repression 
to create the need to protest. 
In addition to political opportunity theory, protests are explained by the 
complimentary theory of resource mobilization. This theory examines how political 
activists use resources, human or otherwise, to create change within social structures, 
while political opportunity theory considers the larger political structure. “Resource” 
                                                 
11 Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” 126. 
12 “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,” 1458. 
13 “Protest and Political Opportunities,” X. 
14 Ibid., 128. 
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must be broadly defined, from the support of elites, to the financial resources necessary to 
dedicate time and energy to protest, to the legal resources that give protesters recourse in 
case of action. The theory of political opportunity has been combined with resource 
mobilization theory to create a new paradigm of political mobilization. Alfred Cuzán, in a 
study of revolutions in the Third World, proposes a paradigm that “sufficent poverty, 
corruption and social, economic and political inequalities, grievances and discontent are 
assumed to exist in most Third World autocracies to legitimize violent revolution. Yet, 
revolution is rare, having more to do with resources, strategy and opportunities than with 
generalized discontent.”15 This theory moves the focus from the individual protesters or 
the specific grievances and to the larger political structure. 
 Theories of social movement, however, cannot only look at explanations; the 
success of political mobilization is also dependent on the type of collective action. 
Langman explores new types of social movements that have emerged from the 
converging forces of globalization and “computer mediated communication”16 called 
“internetworked social movements.” They are distinct from previous movements in their 
structure, longevity and aims, “these movements are themselves decentralized, 
democratic, and not easily subject to control. The campaigns are often long and 
protracted…They are unique forms of activist organizations that have a more global 
orientation and, like their own kind of organizations, envision a more just, more 
democratic world with more diffused, fluid, and egalitarian leadership and empowered 
people.”17 The first such movement Langman points to various recent movements, 
                                                 
15 “Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution,” 401. 
16 “From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice,” 45. 
17 Ibid., 59. 
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beginning with the Zapatistas who used the internet in the late 1990’s to defeat the 
Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Investment in Mexico, the famed Battle of Seattle 
in 2001 extending to feminist networks in the Middle East.  
 The Internet allows for the free dissemination of information, creates “virtual public 
spheres” for organization, contention and mobilization while globalization gives people 
across continents a common grievance. The Internet as the primary medium of 
communication has important implications for the structure of these movements, Sheller 
argues that “today one must also consider how social movements engage in both the 
literal motion of bodies and things through space and with the “virtual mobilities” 
afforded by new information and communication technologies. In what ways are the use 
of “fluid” discourses, organizational forms, and action tactics in contemporary “global” 
movements related to the changing context of liquidity, ambiguity, and diffuse risk.”18  
This can be seen in the leadership, or lack thereof, which is usually diffuse, highly 
decentralized, with little to no structural hierarchy and firmly democratic. These 
movements encompass a wide range of communities including feminism, ecology, labor, 
peace and various anti-capitalists, creating  “a new politics of alliance and solidarity that 
overcome the limitations and solipsism of postmodern identity politics.”19 Although they 
are relatively new, it seems that ISM’s can pose a threat to the greater forces they try to 
oppose by way of their diffuse organization, communication and unity. The disperse 
nature of ISM’s are particularly suited for combating liberalized autocracies in that they 
are so nebulous, fluid and diverse, they can resist cooptation by the state.  
                                                 
18 Ibid., 46. 
19 Ibid., 33. 
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These various theories come together to create a framework with which to 
understand the February 20th movement. As I will demonstrate in the following section, 
the Moroccan state operates as a liberalized autocracy, with the state maintaining power 
through a strategic opening of political opportunities that creates dissonance within 
society and centralizes power within the monarchy. This reality determines the political 
opportunity available to protesters, while the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions created a 
wider opening that provided a catalyst for the creation of this movement. Then, through 
an overview of the organization and demands of the February 20th movement, I will show 
how it acts as an ISM and how this tempers its relationship with the state. Finally, I will 
provide a timeline of what I have chosen as to be the major interactions between the state 
and the February 20th movement up until now. 
 
THE CASE OF FEBRUARY 20
TH
 
Finding a succinct listing of the demands of the February 20th movement is challenging, 
even more so to find an English version. This, however, speaks to the fluid, decentralized 
nature of the movement. It is generally agreed that the movement is calling for the king to 
become a figurehead and the state to become a full democracy, termed a “parliamentary 
monarchy” rather than the “constitutional monarchy” it is now. Laila Lalami, author, 
blogger and defacto representative of Morocco to English speakers, summarizes the 
demands of the movement as: “their demands include constitutional reforms, the 
dissolution of the present parliament, the creation of a temporary transitional government, 
an independent judiciary, accountability for elected officials, language rights for Berber 
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speakers and the release of all political prisoners.”20 These demands demonstrate the 
deplorable state of democracy in Morocco. 
 The first article of the 1996 constitution reads: “Morocco shall have a democratic, 
social and constitutional Monarchy.” The second article ensures the sovereignty of the 
people while the third article protects against a one party system and provides for the 
participation of political parties.”21 A more accurate representation of power in Moroccan 
politics can be found in the country’s motto: “Allah, al Watan, al Malik”, translating to 
“God, Nation, King.” This phrase has often been quoted to show the fundamental, and 
unifying role that the monarchy has within the Moroccan state. In practice, the monarchy 
is the center of Moroccan politics with parliament, the ministries and supposedly 
independent political parties revolving around it. In practice, Morocco operates as a 
liberal autocracy. 
 Brumberg’s first distinction between liberalized and total autocracies is that they 
“have not tried to impose a single vision of political community…they have put a 
symbolic distance between the state and society in ways that leave room for competitive 
or dissonant politics.22” This qualifier is in response to the Arabist-Islamist rhetoric used 
by total autocracies to united their population against rival forces such as the West. 
Morocco takes the opposite tact and promotes the image of a reforming, multicultural, 
pluralistic society. For example, in an article from Islamopedia.com titled “Mohsine El 
Ahmadi examines how Moroccan law promotes multiculturalism, as informed by 
Shari’a,” which describes “King Mohammed VI, who ascended to the throne in 1999, 
                                                 
20 Lalami, “Arab Uprisings.” 
21 “Constitution of Morocco, 1996.” 
22 Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy.” 
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made a strategic decision to introduce democratic reforms and restructure the legal 
system so that Morocco can move toward becoming an inclusive, multi-religious society, 
one which better adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which 
is partly dedicated to progress on religious freedom.” The article goes on to describe the 
king’s creation of an agenda called “Reformation of [the] Religious Field” in 2004 which 
was subsequently delegated to the Minister of Endowment and Islamic Affairs. At the 
2007 writing of the article, however, there was no mention of the practical applications of 
this agenda. 23 The monarchy has made some changes toward creating a more open 
society and society is considerably freer in comparison to his father Hassan II’s 
repressive regime, but much of the changes are in words only. 
 As part of this open regime, plurality has become a hallmark of Moroccan 
politics. In the most recent parliamentary elections in 2007, thirty-three political parties 
and thirteen independent electoral lists competed for 325 seats. Of these parties, five were 
represented in almost every district, and eighteen parties were represented in the majority 
of the country’s ninety-face electoral districts. 24 The overwhelming number of political 
parties creates a cacophony that leaves the monarchy as the center of the power. Amr 
Hamzawy outlines how this political reality stems from “two central impediments to 
democratic transition in Morocco, the concentration of power in royal hands and the 
absence of credible checks and balances.”25 To exacerbate the situation, the electoral 
system is based on proportional representation, which “always produces a fragmented 




24 Hamazy, The 2007 Moroccan Parliamentary Elections: Results and Implications. 
25 Ibid. 
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parliament that is easily checked by the monarchy.” He concludes that the “seemingly 
pluralistic process that has left the monarchy untouched as the final arbiter of the 
system.”26 In this way, Morocco fulfills the second requisite of a liberalized autocracy in 
that  “allow contending groups and ideas to put down institutional roots outside of the 
state” with the intention of creating competition.  The very structure of the Moroccan 
political system ensures dissonance, leaving the king as the arbiter of power. 
 Morocco does not have an “obsessive concern with any single interest, class or 
resource”27 like oil, the economy is diversified with the key areas of the economy being 
agriculture, light manufacturing, tourism and remittances, according to the CIA World 
Fact Book. This, however, does not prevent the monarchy from playing a central role in 
the economy. A WikiLeaks cables from April 24, 2008 revealed the king’s central role in 
Omnium Nord Africain, a holding company that has substantial shares in many of sectors 
of the economy28. The cable was concerned with the dismissal of the CEO of Wana, one 
of ONA’s subsidiaries, because the king was dissatisfied with his handling of the 
company. This cable confirmed the king’s business role, a topic that the cable observed, 
“too have long sparked hushed debate in Moroccan business circles, but few expect the 
royal role in ONA to change anytime soon.” On March 25, 2010, ONA merged with 
Societe Nationale d’Investissement, SNI, another major conglomerate. In 2011, 
Bloomberg News reported that “according to the bourse’s website, SNI owns 48.3 
percent of Attijariwafa Bank, the country’s No. 1 publicly traded lender; 79 percent of 
Wafa Assurance, the biggest insurer; 63.4 percent of Centrale Laitiere, its largest dairy; 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” 61. 
28 “WikiLeaks cables accuse Moroccan royals of corruption | World news | 
guardian.co.uk.” 
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75.8 percent of Lesieur Cristal, the main maker of cooking oils; and 63.5 percent of 
Cosumar, the largest sugar refiner.”29 This issue illustrates the extent of the monarchy’s 
power in Morocco.  
 The structure of the liberal autocracy, however, depends on not only the centrality 
of the monarchy but also on dissonant politics but without any real political society. 
Protest in Morocco have long existed but have not succeeded in changing the political 
structure. They are a common sight in most major cities, with one of the most enduring 
being unemployed university graduates. Human Rights Watch reports that by Moroccan 
law, organizers of an outdoor demonstration must provide advance notification to 
authorities “who may forbid the event if they deem it a threat to the public order.”30 The 
organization continues that “the response of security forces to demonstrations varies 
widely; they sometimes allow the event to run its course undisturbed; sometimes they 
beat the protesters with batons, and assault journalists who photograph or film the 
events.  Authorities have over the years charged hundreds of Moroccans with 
participating in “illegal” demonstrations, and courts have sentenced many of them to 
prison terms of a few to several months.”31 While the Moroccan authorities allow protests 
officially, that opportunity opens and closes as the regime sees fit.  
 This winter, the Arab Spring began. On the television sets and on the front pages, 
Moroccans watched the progress of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, seeing protests 
become revolutions and despotic dictators forced to leave by the will of the people. These 
protests were new; they were lead by the supposedly apathetic youth of the Arab world 
                                                 
29 Aida Alami, “Morocco King’s Investment Fund to Give Up Major Company Stakes - 
Bloomberg.” 
30 Human Rights Watch, Morocco: Thousands March for Reform | Human Rights Watch. 
31 Ibid. 
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and organized using social networks. Within the kingdom, there were some protests in 
support of the regime and in early January and on Facebook there appeared a group 
calling for their own Moroccan uprising. The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions provided 
inspiration for activists and also served as a warning to Morocco’s monarchy. In this way, 
the revolutions temporarily altered the relationship between the state and society, leading 
citizens to question the power of authoritarian regimes. In terms of political opportunity 
these revolutions created a political opening by redefining the place of protest in Arab 
society. Referring back to Tilly and Eisinger’s curvilinear relationship between openness 
and political mobilization, with the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, the political 
opportunity in Morocco moved from a position of ineffective protest to a point at which it 
seemed protest could enact real change.  
 Depending on who you consult, the February 20th movement began with either a 
Facebook group or a video. It all depends on who you ask. In effect, it emerged 
organically and no one can pinpoint the leader or the moment when it first began. The 
two minute YouTube video demonstrates the movement’s beginnings the best. It is 
simple arrangement of young Moroccan men and women, each beginning with “I am 
Moroccan and I will take part in the protest on February 20” and then go on to explain 
their reasons: freedom, equality, an end to corruption, better living standards, education, 
labor rights, Amazigh and other minority rights.32 This video exemplifies the tactics of 
the February 20th movement. It uses new technologies and rhetoric of universal values to 
bring together diverse segments of the Moroccan population. Also, this video and the 
movement that followed, exhibits all the characteristics of an interconnected social 
                                                 
32 Morocco campaign #feb20 #morocco. 
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movement.  
 The February 20th movement was unquestionably born on the Internet and subsists 
on the freedom of information that Langman believes is so necessary for ISMs. By who 
or through which website is an open and irrelevant question for a leaderless movement 
but the impetus, organization and strategy all are from online. The movement has created 
its own website Mamfakinch.com, meaning “Never give up,” which aggregates 
information about the movement. Lakome.com, an alternative news website that 
publishes in both French and Arabic, has also recently been created, and provides a view 
critical of the monarchy. In fact, the most reliable information about the movement can 
all be found online from websites such as Hespress.com, Demain.com and Lakome.com.  
 The rhetoric of the February 20th movement is unmistakably preoccupied with 
Morocco. The flag is featured prominently on websites, the Moroccan identity is strongly 
represented in their releases, even their initial video was began with the phrase “I’m a 
Moroccan.” Their rhetoric does not mirror those of other globalized movements that 
Langman uses as examples of ISMs by calling for international solutions to the negative 
effects of globalization. Their demands, however, do stem from values that have become 
part of the international social justice language. Democracy, justice, equality, an end to 
corruption and freedom are all recognized as universal human rights. Some of the 
demands are very specific to Morocco, however the general call of the movement comes 
from a common international discourse. This rhetoric has attracted groups from all parts 
of Moroccan politics—Islamists, Marxists, and increasingly members of political parties 
all are counted among the members. The majority of the participants however are youth. 
Interestingly, the February 20th movement has no guiding ideology, only demands, 
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allowing for groups with diverse, even contradictory ideologies to coexist as part of the 
movement.  
 These universally appealing goals yet lack of ideology and diversity of 
communities complicate creating a working organization for a movement. As Langman 
pointed out, however, the Internet enables social movements to be incredibly diffuse 
describing their structuring as “decentralized nodules along communication networks as 
are easily created, constructed and rhizomatically spread to deterritorialized “virtual 
public spheres”…where people and information intersect in virtual communities or 
subcultures.”33 The February 20th movement reflects this structure in real public life as 
well. The group is made up of coordinations in the most of the major cities in Morocco 
that meet, discuss and organize their own events. These coordinations are sometimes one 
and the same as the Tansiquiyat, local groups that emerged in 2008 in response to rising 
food prices, an innovative type of civil society in Morocco. The meetings are run 
democratically, without a specific leader. There are officers in the coordinations but they 
mainly serve a logistical purpose such as communicating between the groups. The groups 
have no hierarchy or no official leader. There have, however, emerged certain central 
members who have become the spokespeople for the movement at conferences, with the 
international and national press and at protests. Overall, however, the organizations are 
highly localized with only goals in common. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF A MOVEMENT 
Many ratings agencies listed Morocco as the most stable country in the region after the 
                                                 
33 Langman, “From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice,” 55. 
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Arab Uprising34. While the February 20th movement does not threaten revolution only 
reform, it’s success has startled many observers and the monarchy by surprise. Estimates 
of participants range, but most agree that these protests are the largest, most widespread 
protests in Morocco’s history and they have been growing. Stanford University professor 
and Moroccan, Ahmed Benchemsi claims that there were 120,000 protesters in “no less 
than 53 cities and villages.”35 Since the beginning of the movement until I finished my 
research on May 1, 2011, there has been a constant tug of war between the monarchy 
giving concessions in hopes of controlling the movement and February 20th trying to 
press for more change. The monarchy has responded in ways typical of a liberalized 
autocracy—allowing some openings while attempting to continue maintain central power 
through different policies of cooptation and undermining the movement. Many of the 
February 20th movements actions have tried to circumnavigate the structures the 
monarchy has put in place. This relationship has brought the movement out of traditional 
spaces of political contention; spaces of conflict include music festivals, business 
boardrooms and picnics at secret prisons. As of now, the protests continue while the 
monarchy stays firm. Below is a timeline of the important events in the movement’s short 
but exciting history, but their significance will be discussed later through the interviews.  
 This relationship began before February 20th. There was a media campaign through 
social networks and by some government ministers to discredit members of the protest 
calling them everything from homosexuals to nonbelievers36. Simultaneously, the 
broadcast media networks such as 2M, made lies of omission by completely ignoring 
                                                 
34 “UPDATE 1-Thousands of protesters demand ‘A New Morocco’ | News by Country | 
Reuters.” 
35 Benchemsi, “Moroccan monarchy’s sacredness: an obstacle to democracy - CDDRL.” 
36 Champion, “Morocco Joins In, Defying Predictions.” 
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existence of calls to protest. Government ministers called the protesters foreign agents, a 
scheme borrowed from other rulers in the Arab world, and the official news agency of 
Morocco release a statement that the protests had been canceled.37  
 After the initial protest was deemed a success because of sheer numbers and 
absence of government brutality, the populace seemed emboldened. In the days following 
the protests, media outlets that previously ignored the movement began discussing their 
demands and expectations for the monarchy. The February 20th movement tried to sustain 
momentum by continuing to release information through the Internet, staging smaller 
protests in front of Parliament and coordinating for the next protest nation-wide protest 
on March 20th. Meanwhile, the king stayed silent for weeks while the country waited 
expectantly.  
 On March 9, the king made his speech. In it he outlined what seems like sweeping 
reforms that have the potential to significantly alter the political system. They include the 
direct election of the prime minister and regional governors, full recognition of the 
Amazigh identity and transforming the judiciary into an independent branch of 
government. There was no mention of the February 20th movement. The next day he 
appointed a constitutional commission made up of by, as Benchemsi puts it “18 local 
experts, the overwhelming majority of whom are loyal civil servants. Little independent 
spirit is consequently expected.”38 The commission was instructed by the king to “listen 
to political parties, trade unions, youth organizations and qualified civil society groups, 
intellectuals and scholars, to work closely with them and to seek their views.”39 Political 
                                                 
37 Lalami, “Morocco’s Moderate Revolution.” 
38 Benchemsi, “Moroccan monarchy’s sacredness: an obstacle to democracy - CDDRL.” 
39 His Majesty, “Moroccan king promises reform.” 
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party spokespeople, domestic media sources and government officials all hailed it as a 
landmark move by the king to voluntarily give up power, many remained skeptical. 
Political parties soon after presented their proposals, which mirrored the king’s wishes 
though appeared to be more extensive than their previous platforms for change, making it 
appear that the success of the February 20th movement had radicalized them. Reuters 
reported that Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, said reform would “not strip 
him of his broad powers” but allow greater political participation “which will likely 
placate many regime critics.”40 Regardless, the March 20th protests continued as planned, 
peaceful with more numbers than before. 
 On April 5th, Reuters reported that 45 members of the February 20th movement 
from 40 different cities were invited to participate in a meeting on April 16th, although 
the movement had was skeptical of the king’s real commitment to reform.41  The process 
of rejection provided insight into the workings of the leaderless movement—on April 5th, 
Reuters reported that the Rabat constituency would boycott the talks and by April 8th the 
entire movement had rejected the invitation. One member explained, “They could have 
released political prisoners or shown serious resolve fighting corruption by unearthing 
old and recent cases”42 By rejecting involvement in the constitutional commission, the 
movement made clear that it demanded material proof of the king’s commitment, not 
symbolic acts.  
 On April 10th, Mamfakinch.com released an open letter written by the February 20th 
movement addressed to the artists of the music festival Mawazine, asking for them to 
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cancel their appearance, saying “By refusing to attend, you will contribute to reforming 
Morocco and paving the way for its transition to democracy” 43 Mawazine has been held 
annually since 2001 and has evolved into a major music festival featuring local, national 
and international pop stars. As the Facebook group “The National Campaign for the 
Cancelation of the Mawazine Music Festival” explains “the priorities for spending public 
funds in Morocco should be the infrastructure, the promotion of basic services and the 
provision of jobs for the youth.”44 It has come under recent criticism as being part of the 
“festivalization” of Morocco, a trend towards commodification of Morocco’s culture into 
festivals and also placating the youth by spending money on entertainment rather than 
government projects.  
 On April 14th, 190 political prisoners, mainly Salafi jihadist prisioners, had their 
sentences pardoned or reduced by Mohammed VI.45 The trials of many of these 
prisioners were highly controversial because they were one of the 2,000 people arrested 
after the Casablanca bombings. One of the prisoners, Mustapha Mouatassim, explicitly 
thanked the youth for their release.46 The government, however, did not mention the 
movement’s role in their decision to release the prisoners. 
 On April 22nd, Bloomberg reported that the monarchy was decreasing its 
involvement with the group SNI, which it described as a “Moroccan investment fund 
with assets valued at least $2 billion controlled by King Mohammed VI” has “plans to 
become a minority investor in a number of companies to reduce its influence over the 
                                                 
43 Almiraat, “Morocco: Controversy Over International Music Festival · Global Voices.” 
44 Ibid. 
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economy.”47 Karim Chbani, an investment manager for the fund, responded to criticism 
about SNI’s close role with the monarchy in that it had “contributed to the economic and 
social development of Morocco and that “we have always ensured transparency and civic 
responsibility”48 While the representative did not state whether this was inspired by the 
protests, the king’s business role had been a central complaint in the May 20th protest and 
was to be rallying cry for the April 24th protests.  
 The April 24th protest was promoted heavily by the February 20th movement, 
including a guerilla appearance on a national TV program when audience members held 
up signs with the movement’s logo on it, visibly distracting the host. Coordination was 
again put together on Facebook, with Mamfakinch.com providing a Google map guide to 
the locations of all the protests, which it reported was now in 100 towns around 
Morocco.49 This protest was focused on corruption and unemployment, with calls for El 
Himma, Fasi and other corrupt elites to step down. In Rabat, the protest was moved to a 
low-income residential neighborhood, at once bringing the protest to a wider public and 
bringing media attention to the social problems in Morocco. Reuters reported that 10,000 
people joined in at the Casablanca protests and again the nationwide numbers were 
reported to have increased.  
 On April 26th, Prime Minister Abbas Al Fassi announced an increase in minimum 
wage that would cost the government up to $5 billion over the next five years, a major 
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win for labor unions. 50 According to state television, public sector employees would 
receive an increase in 600 per month beginning May 1 while, minimum wage for private 
sector employees would be raised by 10% from July and 5% at the beginning of 2012. 
The current minimum wage is 2,110 dirhams. Additionally, The minimum pension would 
be raised by 70% to 1,000 dirhams per month. The government also promised jobs in the 
public sector for 4,300 graduates and higher wages and benefits to the 47,000 members of 
auxiliary forces who tame protests and fight riots.51  
 Then, on April 29th, a bomb went off in a popular tourist cafe in Marrakech, killing 
16 people. This bomb was called a terrorist attack, some speculating that it had the 
hallmarks of an Al Qaeda attack. This is the first major terrorist attack since the 
Casablanca bombings in 2003. 
 On May 1st there are traditionally protests of labor unions across the globe with 
Morocco being no exception. February 20th asked to march with the workers, saying if 
they were rejected they would march separately for worker’s rights and also denouncing 
terrorism. Despite the government’s agreement to raise wages, two of the largest labor 
unions in Morocco, the UMT and the CDT, agreed to march with February 20th. The 
UMT’s procession was lead with a sign reading “for the dissolution of the government 
and parliament.”52  
 The movement continues with the routine of weekly protests, with the plans posted 
on the Facebook group’s wall and website. They plan to hold demonstrations in solidarity 
with those killed or wounded in the bombings and denounce terrorism in Marrakech on 
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May 8th. Also, there are plans to incorporate innovative forms of protest, the next major 
project is a picnic in the forest surrounding the secret Temara detention center on May 
15th. Lakome reports that “by this action, the movement claims to trial those responsible 
for torture and serious violations of human rights.53”  
 Throughout the past three months, there have been three nationwide protests, each 
with increasing numbers of participants across larger swaths of the nation. Responses 
have come from all corners of the polity: The king initiated a constitutional reform 
commission; Political parties have radicalized their own rhetoric to closer match that of 
the movement; Labor unions agreed to march with the young protesters. However, by 
simply watching the political scene, much of the story is lost. The king has also raised 
minimum wage and gave more jobs to unemployed graduates, addressing economic 
grievances. A music festival became a symbol of squandering of government money. The 
king partially bowed out of his “business role” by reducing SNI’s share of their 
subsidiaries, quietly addressing charges of corruption. A terrorist attack changed the 
agenda of the movement and brought the country to a standstill. These interactions can be 
summarized as the king giving small allowances in different sectors to placate the people 
enough that this movement does not become bigger. It also can be seen as either strategic 
or foolish maneuvering by the movement to stay free of influence of the king by rejecting 
any direct negotiation. There are few prospects for resolution and many continue to 
speculate on the outcome. In the next section, I outline the viewpoints of four Moroccans 
close to the movement, each attempting to answer the questions: Why Now and What 
Next? 
                                                 




The two primary limitations in conducting field research on this topic were time and 
language. I was limited to three and a half weeks of field research, which severely limited 
the breadth and depth of my research. Secondly, I am only comfortable interviewing in 
English and Spanish. I used a translator in two of my interviews, both of which are noted 
in the paper. One portion of an interview was, amusingly, conducted through Google 
Translate, which I have duly noted. While I tried to interpret and understand these 
interviews through the translator, technological or human, certain words, feelings and 
emotions were undoubtedly lost. These limited language abilities also biased whose 
viewpoints I was able to hear. With most of the interviews I formally sought I did not 
specify that it must be in English, such as my interviews with government officials and 
recognized leaders of the February 20th movement. My informal and spontaneous 
interviews I conducted on the streets and at protests, however, were limited to English 
speakers. This may have biased my sources towards more educated, richer, more 
cosmopolitan segments of society so that I was unable to capture a wide overview of 
protesters here. 
My restricted language capabilities also limited me to articles, media, social 
networking pages and so forth that were primarily in French rather than Arabic sources. 
Much of my information and news came from the Francophone sources. I did also use 
Google Translate for a basic understanding of postings from social media sites, but I 
could not translate the hybrid Latin alphabet form of Arabic popular on these forums.  
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The largest limitation to my research was that subject was constantly evolving, and 
continues to. I arrived in Morocco before the February 20th movement had even been 
manifested in its eponymous protest. My research began on April 11th and this paper only 
considers events up to the May 1st protests. Because the movement evolved as I carried 
out my research, some interviews were conducted before and others after important 
national events, such as the Marrakesh bombings and the April 24th and May 1st protests. 
These events may have affected how interviewees responded to questions, so the dates of 
the interviews must be taken into consideration.  
 
WHY NOW, WHAT NEXT? 
Capturing, evaluating and explaining a movement in real time is nearly impossible. 
Nevertheless, government officials, academics, people deeply involved in the movement 
and regular citizens are continually attempting to answer the question: Why Now? And 
What Next? 
Each response creates a rhetoric that attempts to explain the social movement. 
Through interviews with representatives of different participants and “rhetoric-builders” I 
have attempted to capture the existing perspectives about the February 20th movement. 
The assembly is imperfect, but it provides a varied group of explanations, criticisms, 
expectations and evaluations of the movement. Included are academics partial to the 
movement, government officials against the movement, self-proclaimed alienated 
leaders, various protesters and central organizers. Some topics are revisited by most, such 
as the role of Facebook, the Arab Spring or corruption within the government, while 
some topics and viewpoints are mentioned by some individuals. After each one I analyze 
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and contextualize, however each of these viewpoints are up for further interpretation and 
analysis as the movement develops and history solidifies an answer to those 
unanswerable questions: Why Now and What Next? 
 
THE ACADEMIC 
Mohammad Madani is a political scientist and professor of constitutional law at 
Mohammad V University in Rabat. He was introduced to me as an academic following 
the February 20th movement. His previous scholarship includes the book Le paysage 
politique Marocain, and he has participated in various seminars concerning the Moroccan 
political sphere. His interest in the February 20th movement is more than academic, he 
also has participated in some of the marches. I talked to him in the middle of April.  
Shortly after we sat down and I explained my curiosity in the subject, he laughed 
and said, “I suppose the question is, why now?” It is a difficult question, almost 
impossible to answer, he said. But, he began to try. 
“Morocco has been undergoing a silent revolution.” Demographically, the country 
joins the rest of the Arab world with a youth bubble. Not only are these youth distinctive 
in their numbers, but they also have an entirely different political, social and cultural 
outlook than previous generations. Many of them grew up with Mohammad VI, known as 
the “new reform-minded king” and did not experience the repression of the years of 
Hassan II. They have seen the reforms of the king and those have become part of the 
political expectations. 
In addition to the political openness, the family structure has been deeply changed 
with the shift to urban lifestyles. Families have changed from large extended family 
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networks to small nuclear families. Also, for both economic and social reasons, family 
planning has become more common and more education is available for women. With 
this shift toward smaller families, the individual has become more important. As Madani 
put it, “the individual is more emancipated.” What remains to be seen, and what 
academics such as Madani have been waiting for, is how this new individuation will 
affect the political arena. 
On Facebook, the individual finds a new space of expression. Facebook is a 
perfect medium to not only express personal interests but also to operate independently of 
the family, other societal forces, and most importantly, the state. Madani sees it as 
creating “a new public space” and, subsequently, a “new way of political participation”.  
Madani hestitates to credit Facebook with creating civil society in Morocco, but he 
believes its importance lies in that it “gives the young people a space which is not 
supervised by the State. The state does not watch it like it watches real space.” This 
virtual space has emerged as a “space for contention.”  
“We can’t talk about the public sphere if there is not access to information” 
Madani contends. Outside of Facebook, Moroccan Internet news sources, such as 
Lakome.com and Demain.com, have recently been created to compensate for the 
deficiencies of the print and broadcast media. Through these new forums, users can 
create alternative information from raw video uploads to opinion pieces. This adds a 
parallel source of information to the controlled information of the state. Facebook has 
allowed the new youth of Morocco to express their individuality but also freely exchange 
information about politics and society, creating an alternate public space that did not exist 
previously.  
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As for the state’s official reaction to the movement, Madani was unimpressed. 
“The king’s speech was an answer to the movement, but not real. It’s a formal answer but 
not to the main grievances of the movement.” It did not signal that the king would 
become a symbolic leader, only a restructuring of some elements of government. Madani 
equates the state with the monarchy and the Makhzen , and did not see this speech or any 
of the king’s reactions as changing their central role. Importantly, however, this speech 
signifies that the movement has the attention of the powerful. “Now, everyone, the 
parties, the king and the government are listening to what the movement says”, Madani 
says.  
The other reactions of the state, however, also interest Madani. The largest 
obstacle to making the February 20th movement a sustainable movement is making 
connections with the “popular class.” Madani points out that in the Egyptian revolution, 
the poorer segments of society joined the middle class intellectuals who began the 
movement within the first week. While he says he cannot yet fully explain this issue, he 
hypothesizes that it is due to two issues: the complexity of the movement’s demands and 
the state’s attempts to placate the people. The first issue he hopes will be resolved with 
time as people begin to talk about and understand what is a “parliamentary monarchy.” 
The second issue is the state’s attempts at placating, controlling and garnering support 
within the population. At the time of our interview on April 18th, Madani had observed 
that the state was trying to address existing grievances such as raising workers wages, in 
order to keep the support of the labor unions, an important part of civil society. Even 
small groups were benefitting, crackdowns on street sellers had decreased. These tactics 
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were not surprising to Madani, since they were similar to the creation of government jobs 
for unemployed graduates. The aim, Madani explained, was to “contain the movement.”  
The reactions of the parties and the media seemed to Madani to be attempting to 
follow the shifts in power. The media had begun to cover the movement it had mainly 
ignored before February 20th because, as Madani put it “the movement is marketable”; 
protests sell papers. The parties are taking a “wait and see” approach, shifting with small 
steps towards the movement. He did point out that some of the parties were nothing but a 
continuation of the state. If the movement continues to be “strong and compact” in the 
April 24th protests, the parties may shift closer.   
On April 11th, he outlined his hopes, his fears and his worse fears. His hope, he 
said, was that this movement leads to “successful establishment of a sustainable 
democracy.” His fear, however, was that “the popular class will not follow the 
movement, but in that case the people in the middle class will find a way to make 
democracy.” The worse case scenario, however, is an increasingly authoritarian state. 
However, Madani was less hopeful than he had been three weeks prior, but still saw the 
February 20th movement as a breaking point in Moroccan political history.  
Overall, however, he held hope for the future: “You can’t contain a generation. 
You can political actors.” Even if the February 20th movement did not make real gains 
during this time, the change and discourse they had begun would be present for 
generations to come. “This is new to have people fighting in the streets for democracy.” 
He maintains, also, that the changes the movement calls for are the best for Morocco. 
“Democracy is not only a grievance for elites, but it benefits all parts of society.” He 
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concluded, “what is important is that the movement stays unified, strong and makes the 
link with the popular class.”  
————— 
Madani’s view on the February 20th movement has been informed on years of experience 
in academia and politics. He looks at the situation in the terms of political science—the 
state, civil society and different political systems. Although his analysis of the situation is 
biased towards his support of the February 20th movement, he does provide a close to 
impartial overview of the major players within Moroccan politics.  
Madani explained the existence of the February 20th movement mainly through societal 
changes. He did not mention any increased adversity that may have prompted the 
protests. Instead, he saw demographic factors and the development of a new medium as 
being principally responsible. According to political opportunity theory, a concept 
Madani could very well be familiar with, these external factors are the best predictors of 
popular uprisings, not single events or increases in grievances.  
Madani highlights Facebook and the free flow of information as one of the most 
instrumental tools that create political opportunity for protesters. The Internet as a 
democratizing force has been widely discussed and documented, and the role of social 
networking in the Arab Uprisings is another example of this relationship. It is important 
to note, however, that Madani sees Facebook and its popularity as being tied to the new 
culture of the individual in Moroccan society, so that the presence of this social medium 
has complemented, developed and enabled a tendency that was already present due to 
demographic changes. Facebook itself cannot be credited with the creation of 
individuality, it is a passive actor. The Internet and Facebook, however, did create a new 
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public space and forum for information that Madani saw as instrumental in creating, 
strengthening and sustaining this movement.  
The concept of public space came up many times in my interview with Madani. 
He mentioned public space as if it were an emerging phenomenon—that public space can 
only exist with free access to information. Public and private space are clearly delineated 
in Morocco, with each one having different sets of norms and social protocol. In 
Madani’s use of the term public space, however, it signifies a space for open discourse 
and political participation. This sort of public space does not exist in Morocco, except for 
in the so-called “virtual public spheres” online. Otherwise, public space is under scrutiny 
by the state, demonstrating the control the state exercises over political discourse. This 
control shows how in everyday life, Morocco operates as an autocracy.  
The autocratic nature of the Moroccan state is further proved in Madani’s 
assertion that the state is the monarchy and the Makhzen. This definition excludes the 
legislature, political parties and the judiciary, fundamental components of the state in a 
democracy. Clearly, the representative portions of the government are almost powerless, 
leaving the people out of the government. Madani sees democracy as the form of 
government that is best for Morocco. Interestingly, rather he said that democracy would 
not only benefit the elites but also the poor, reversing the traditional way that democracy 
is conceptualized. Democracy is seen as something that empowers grassroots, 
marginalized people, yet it is being fought for by the “elites” of Moroccan society. These 
elites are the not the powerful circle of the Makhzen that benefit from the autocratic 
regime, but the ones who are elite in a socioeconomic sense—educated, middle class, 
urban dwellers—who provide support for the February 20th movement.  
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In most conceptions of resource mobilization theory, human resources usually are 
exactly these elite—ones who are conscientious and demand change with secure enough 
finances to support the cause. The February 20th movement is experiencing an interesting 
reversal of this reality, in that they now need to mobilize the rest of the population. This 
population does not have financial capital to contribute but they provide the human mass 
that immediately threatens political parties and by extension, the regime. As Madani 
mentioned, in order to mobilize this group they must understand the somewhat 
complicated idea of a “parliamentary monarchy” as opposed a “constitutional monarchy”. 
Essentially, the February 20th movement is trying to make the population aware that they 
are living in a autocracy not a democracy. It is not by mobilizing financial resources but 
by creating a popular consciousness that the February 20th movement can truly threaten 
the regime. As Madani concludes, however, this generation made up of individuals and 
empowered by the freedom of information cannot be controlled forever.  
Madani outlines the forces driving the movement and the obstacles. There are 
major societal and demographic forces that have created the February 20th generation, 
while the state is conscientiously opening the political system enough to maintain power. 
In Madani’s evaluation of the February 20th movement, its existence is not surprising and 
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I interviewed Mohammad Reda Bouaya, director of the National Insitute for Youth and 
Democracy the day after the April 24th protest. This interview was first translated by a 
student whose grasp of English was not sufficient so we resorted to using Google 
Translate to translate his French to English until luckily, a man who had lived in America 
for twelve years dropped by and served as a translator for the remainder of the interview. 
Although the language barrier was a hindrance to our understanding of each other, it also 
forced each of us to be very direct in our questions and answers. He assumed the role as a 
representative of his organization and deigned to give personal opinions about my 
questions.  
Bouaya explained that his office is responsible for “the development and training 
of youth political leaders and the integration of citizenship in the society”. The institute 
gets funding from the Moroccan government through the Ministry of Youth and Sport, as 
well as through Fredreich Edbert and sometimes from USAID. These organizations both 
are Western with mission statements that state they are interested in promoting 
democracy. The programs are nondiscriminatory in terms of ideology—it works with 
youth involved in political parties from the left, right and center and as well as for 
politically active youth in universities, schools and government ministries.  
Bouaya’s also used external forces to explain the February 20th movement. He 
immediately explained that, “we are a developing country. We have social, political and 
economic problems.” He went on to enumerate the social problems including a high 
unemployment rate and low incomes. The general idea he tried to convey was that the 
February 20th movement was voicing grievances that had long been part of society. 
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Bouaya could not give his personal viewpoint but did outline the organization’s 
stance on this on the February 20th movement which consisted of explaining the right to 
protest in Morocco. He enumerated them as such: “First, all people have the right to 
peaceful protest. Second, all people have the right to express their expectations and 
problems while respecting the views of others. Third, this is a country with laws and you 
must respect the laws of the country.” There is openness for political contention in 
Morocco, Bouaya explained, “the youth can participate and express their opinion through 
the right forms of communication and dialogue.”  
Bouaya sees the February 20th movement as being successful in gathering support 
from different segments of society and recognizing the social and economic problems. 
It’s weakness however, is that it is doing nothing but copying the Arab Spring. “Morocco 
is different” he said. Bouaya is alluding to the idea of Moroccan exceptionalism, which 
believes that Morocco’s relative stability and liberal society is proof that it does not have 
the same problems as the rest of the Arab world. The problems can range from such 
varied issues as despotism, human rights abuses or Islamic fundamentalism. “They’re just 
shouting” Bouaya continued to say to describe the participants of the February 20th 
movement. “They just want to get on TV,” he said. On the whole, he took a pessimistic 
view on the future of the movement, firmly saying “there is no future for the movement.”  
The only effect Bouaya could see that the February 20th movement had on the 
monarchy is that it quickened the pace of reform. The constitutional reform, he explained, 
“Sooner or later it would happen through the government.” As for the political prisoners 
who had been released on April 14th, their release was preprogrammed.” He continued, 
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aided by our newfound translator, “We’ve been having freedom of speech since the 
1960s.” When I asked about the years of lead, he corrected himself, changing to 1996. 
As for corruption it is a reality of Moroccan politics, “it’s a problem with the 
rotten Moroccan mind.” This stretches from the government to the February 20th 
movement since “most people in the February 20th movement are corruptible.” The king, 
however, does not suffer from the Moroccan mind according to Bouaya. I asked him why 
people think that the king is not corrupt if the people he chooses to surround himself with 
are. First, he immediately reminded me that “I never said the people around the king are 
corrupt.” Then, he said that while some of those around the king are corrupt, the monarch 
himself is good.  
————— 
 
Throughout Bouaya’s interview emphasized the structural causes of Morocco’s 
social, economic and political problems. He understood the grievances of the people of 
the February 20th movement to be valid. These problems, however, were not due to 
governmental policies but a result of its status as a developing country. The monarchy 
and government cannot be held accountable for structural problems since these stem from 
issues outside of their control. As for issues within the system, such as corruption, he 
blamed those upon a cultural mentality that was endemic to Morocco. These are useful 
points of view to take since while it does not ignore the issues of the society, it places 
responsibility on forces beyond any one actor’s control. This transfer of blame gives the 
state impunity from its own failings and makes protesting the state illogical. 
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A liberalized autocracy earns it’s name because it has the trapping of a democracy 
but continues to exhibit autocratic behaviors. Accordingly, Bouaya continually 
emphasized the democratic nature of Moroccan society while ignoring autocratic 
tendencies. Each of these rights and responsibilities he listed adhere to the ideals of 
democracy and the implication was that the February 20th movement was to act as any 
other political organization in a democracy. It is important to note that in each of the 
three rights he listed, the agent was always the protester, who had both the right to 
contention, but also the responsibility to respect the laws. There was no mention of the 
government’s responsibility to answer the demands of the protester. While Bouaya was 
using the rhetoric of democracy, he was implying that there is little responsibility that the 
state has towards the citizen, yet the citizen must respect the state. 
For a liberalized autocracy to remain successful, it must maintain its legitimacy. 
In Morocco this means not only the traditional legitimacy of the king but also his role as 
a reform-minded king. Adding to this rhetoric of Morocco as a democracy, he continually 
routinized the February 20th protest movement and made it clear that the state was acting 
independent of the demands of the movement. All of these actions are simply part of the 
democratic transition process that the king started as he took power. This political 
opening in response to protests is a classic tactic of a liberalized autocracy. Furthermore, 
he belittled the protesters themselves, making it clear that their true aims in protesting 
was glamour and were corruptible. Obviously, such people could not viably criticize the 
king or even critique it. This argument legitimizes the king’s centrality in the state by 
maintaining that it accurately representing the needs of the people.  
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Bouaya constructs a paradigm of the Moroccan political system that firmly 
maintains the monarchy as the legitimate arbiter of power in Morocco. He does recognize 
issues in Moroccan society, but those are caused by structural issues outside of state 
control. Furthermore, the protesters do not present a viable alternative to the state’s 
power and their critiques are misguided and methods are improper. All of these elements 






Said Benjabli is the self-proclaimed leader of the February 20th protest movement, which 
is a self-proclaimed leaderless movement. His claim rests on the fact that he was the first 
one to create the February 20th movement Facebook group, although technically he only 
changed the name from “Moroccan’s Communicate Directly With Mohammad VI.”  His 
legitimacy has been recognized by the United States State Department, who flew him to 
America recently to participate on various panels and allow him to experience the nation. 
He is also frequently quoted in foreign papers as a representative of the movement.  As 
the movement has progressed, however, Benjabli has been ostracized, even losing his 
administrator status of the group he created. Benjabli was there from the beginning, but 
his methods did not follow with the rest of the movement.  
 
Benjabli has had a long experience with political and digital activism. His activist 
credentials include a long involvement with the PJD, which ended with a five-month 
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prison sentence after he protested a new education law by ripping an exam paper. During 
that time he decided to leave the PJD after developing his own idea of secularism, 
explaining that “you develop your own ideas in prison, you can’t develop your ideas as 
part of a group.” Before his involvement with the February 20th movement he was the 
president of the Moroccan Bloggers Association and now he is a writer for Hespress.com, 
which he says is the top news site in Morocco. 
The beginning of the February 20th movement surprised Benjabli. After the name 
change, Said watched his group increase to 15,000 members in 20 days. At first, he chose 
to be anonymous in the creation of his page, because he knew that he would become a 
target of the government. He only revealed himself at the end to “give the page 
credibility.” Immediately after identifying himself, he became the object of slander 
produced by, according to Benjabli, the government and opposition groups who “named 
me gay, nonbeliever and traitor.”As it became clear that what had began on Facebook 
was going to be a movement, there rose various groups with differing conceptions of 
what the future of the movement should be. His ideas were not accepted by most of the 
February 20th movement and though a process that Benjabli did not specify, he was 
ousted from his role in the movement. Now, he takes a highly critical stance on the way 
the movement’s strategy, organization and future. 
Benjabli also explains the beginning of the February 20th movement with outside 
factors. As Madani did, he sees the freedom of information that the Internet provides as a 
key catalyst for the emergence of the protest movement in Morocco. The Arab Uprising 
provided the inspiration, “we are now seeing that Morocco is living in the past. We want 
to live in our times.” He further explains that the combination of free information and a 
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modernized mentality means that the ineffectiveness of government has now become 
unacceptable to the general population. This has created a frustration in the population 
that is aimed entirely at the government,  “We know there are many problems. We also 
now know the solutions. We can see the problems, we can see the solutions, and we see 
that the government does nothing. There are resources, intelligent men, and the 
government does nothing.” The final piece is that there is no longer violent oppression to 
protests, “now the government cannot kill hundreds. There has been a change in 
mentality.” Benjabli attributes the February 20th movement with an opening of society, 
state and information, which has created a new mentality in Morocco that is supportive of 
protest movements. 
To Benjabli, leadership has always been a problem with in contentious Moroccan 
politics. Before the beginning of the Arab Spring, Benjabli attempted to bring together 
different groups such as political parties, labor unions and human rights groups with “no 
results” He outlined the reasons for his failure. First, “I am loser man.” Second, the 
prevailing mentality of “ideology before goals”, which he labeled as an “Arab and 
Moroccan problem.” Third, “people like things clear with a plan”, which is challenging 
when unifying differing sectors of society. The fourth reason for failure, was “we need 
more time.”  
This organizational strategy according to Benjabli, is not sustainable. Benjabli 
contends that “leadership is necessary for in movements that want change. Without 
leaders we are only pawns of the parties.” Without leadership, the February 20th 
movement is vulnerable to being manipulated, which Benjabli believes is happening now 
as children of political party members rise to prominence within the movement and try to 
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enact their parent’s policies. While the Egyptian and Tunsian revolutions were lead by 
“real activists” the youth of the February 20th movement are “fake heroes.” The February 
20th movement he believes “N’est pas normal,” meaning it is not authentic.  
“We are making a new revolution with old tools,” as a result of the dependency 
on preivous generations. He points to the graphic style adopted by the movement saying 
it tries to evoke bygone revolutions, “What is the color of the February 20th movement? 
Black. The color of freedom should be yellow, or green, or blue, but not black.” Some of 
the protesters even refuse to have their photos taken, which Benjabli finds ludicrous, “We 
are a Facebook revolution, we can’t have a Facebook revolution without pictures. It is not 
creative, just like other generations.” In order to be truly successful, the February 20th 
movement must embrace a new ideology. 
Despite these failings of the movement, Benjabli remains hopeful. He does not 
believe that real change will come with the constitutional reform, but instead will come in 
the next two or three years. He, as Madani, believes that the February 20th movement 
represents a change in the mentality of contentious politics in Morocco.  
————— 
Benjabli provides insight into the creation of a movement through Facebook—the 
viral mushrooming of members, the power and pitfalls of anonymity and the lack of 
cohension that ousted him from his role. He gives a first hand account of the state’s 
attempt to discredit individuals of the movement, though importantly, no one spoke out 
against the movement’s right to exist, again demonstrating the balance Morocco 
maintains between democracy and autocracy. He emphasizes, however the power of free 
information in not only creating a new movement but also a new consciousness among 
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the population. This sort of mass dissemination of information is what interconnected 
social networks thrive on. This change in mentality is what Benjabli believes is to be the 
legacy of the February 20th movement, even if they do not achieve their immediate goals. 
This new type of movement seems to Benjali to be creating a new form of political 
society. 
Benjabli was, as a whole, critical of the organizational strategy of the February 
20th movement, seeing this as its major weakness. His assessment of the lack of 
leadership questions the effectiveness of the fluid, diffuse networks of organization that 
loosely bind ISMs. His experience of being ousted from a leadership position may have 
colored his perceptions of the movement, although this does not make his criticisms 
invalid. As a result, the movement is liable to be corrupted by outside forces, lack a 
guiding strategy to allow it to negotiate the state’s tactics and creates a reliance on 
traditional concepts of revolution.  
Benjabli’s disappointment in not succeeding in uniting different sectors of the 
activist community earlier was palpable, but in outlining these failures, he was 
contextualizing the success of the February 20th movement. As young protesters they are 
automatically charismatic. Also, as a leaderless movement without an ideology, they are 
united by their demands, which provide enough clarity that other activist organizations 
are eager to be supportive rather than be divided by ideals. The existence of dissonance 
among protest groups also speaks to the influence of liberalized autocracy on even 
oppositional, extra-institutional politics in Morocco. By specializing within an autocratic 
system, the state does not perceive the movement as a threat to its legitimacy and the 
state is more likely to met the demands of the people. While this empowers individual 
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movements, it allows the state to “divide and rule” as Brumberg outlined. By completely 
eschewing an explicit ideology, the February 20th movement has been able to accomplish 




Omar Radi is 25 years old, but he has been involved in politics for ten years. He first 
joined the anti-globalization group ATTAC when he was sixteen, since then he has been 
involved in such widely publicized campaigns such as the one against the Ramadan fast 
and also with the Casablanca Tansiquiyat, where he was part of the ten people who first 
proposed the February 20th movement. He now works as an independent journalist, 
writing for Les Echos and volunteering his services for Lakome.com. He has become 
something of a spokesman for the movement and its supporters, frequently participating 
in debates covering topics such as civil liberties in Morocco or the future of the 
constitutional reform. Radi shrugs off his involvement the movement, saying “I’ve been a 
militant activist for many years, it corresponds.” I met him at the April 24th protest, and 
we later met to interview on April 26th and May 6th. 
Radi explains the February 20th movement as being partially inspired by the 
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia and also being facilitated by the freedom of information 
and organizational capacity of Facebook. He sees the February 20th movement as coming 
from a long history of protest in Morocco, saying for years “the only way to make change 
in states like Morocco is to protest.” It is only recently with the February 20th movement 
that there has been a change across protest movements, “now there is a new mentality 
                                                 
56 Radi, interview. 
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that we need to strengthen and we need to unify.” The unity comes from the demands of 
the movement, which this is not surprising since, according to Radi, these demands 
surfaced in the 70s and include “freedom of expression, freedom to create political parties 
and ending antidemocratic practices.” Since then, different political organizations have 
specialized in certain demands, but on Facebook “the youth synthesized them and 
published a call.” The February 20th movement is able to rally so much support from 
political groups with such opposing ideologies specifically because these demands are 
“common points of all the ideologies.”   
 Radi sees connections between these demands and global movements. To him, the 
demands themselves are universal rights. His conception of these values as universal 
stems from his opinions of globalization; he supports a non-exploitative globalization, 
believing that the transfer of technology and ideas across cultures is good. He names 
“democracy, justice and equality” as universal human rights, and ones that Moroccans, as 
well as all other citizens, are entitled to. He mentioned that he personally had been 
inspired by other activists such as the 2001 Argentina uprisings in the wake of the 
economic crisis and also the Battle of Seattle, but others drew inspiration from other 
sources. Radi, however, is not interested in theories. He sees them as byproducts of 
academia that do not necessarily explain reality. Most importantly they are not useful in 
guiding the actions of movements.  
As for the leaderless organization of the February 20th movement, Radi sees it as 
nothing new, and merely a matter of practicality. “How do you organize 100 different 
February 20th movements in 100 different cities? If we spend all of our time trying to 
form a hierarchy and talking about leadership, we will not get anything done.”  After all, 
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“if there is a head of the organization, the state can kill, well, neutralize the head.” It is 
more than a matter of survival to Radi, goals are simply more important than creating an 
ideology.  He points out that the February 20th movement is not only protesting but 
holding meetings across the country, creating change and proposals. As a side note, he 
mentioned that he had the idea to have a picnic next to the secret detention center of 
Temara. 
Radi explains that the February 20th movement makes many of its decisions in a 
highly decentralized manner. There are weekly meetings of coordinations of the February 
20th movement in many of the major cities. At these meetings, a few people volunteer and 
then are elected to lead the meeting, where they cover topics that are proposed, also, by 
the mass. There are a few officials within the movement, but mainly to operate the 
logistics, such as a communication officer who connects the different coordinations, 
represents the movement to the press or releases statements, such as the open letter to the 
performing artists of Mawazine. This anarchistic form of organization evolved 
organically, according to Radi, and is enabled by Facebook.  
I should note, however, other activists I talked to do not agree upon that Radi’s 
explanation of how the February 20th movement operates. These differing viewpoints on 
the organizational strategy of the February 20th movement may be a result on the fact that 
they don’t have one. Since this movement is constantly evolving and has only been in 
existence for a few months, it may be too soon to define its strategy.  
Overall, Radi is very optimistic about the future of the February 20th movement. 
However, he mentioned that there is the possibility that if the king begins to answer with 
repression, the movement could “radicalize” and there could be violence. Barring that  
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possibility, the movement does not want to become a political party “they just want to 
[support] the change and after that reorganize the political scene.” Their role would be to 
give credibility to some parties, to support other parties, perhaps even create other parties, 
according to Radi. While he did not specify a guiding ideology for this new role, he said 
it would merely be “the change they want.”  
————— 
 
Radi takes an interesting position among activists. He is the archetype of a 
member of an ISM, in that he is steeped in a globalized political discourse, applies them 
to his immediate context and then uses the Internet to mobilize. As both a print and 
online journalist Radi takes an active role in disseminating alternative information to the 
Moroccan population. As an activist, he applies the lessons from international 
organizations to the Moroccan context, melding strategies to create innovative forms of 
protest. While Radi does not exemplify all members of the February 20th movement, an 
archetype that does not exist, his brand of activism has shaped the way in which the 
movement relates to the state. 
This education makes the ISM form of organization seem very logical. The 
Internet enables expansive, horizontal organization so that hierarchies become irrelevant. 
Without this form of communication organizing 100 different coordinations in 100 cities 
would necessitate the creation of a chain-of-command. To Radi, it is self-evident that the 
construction of a hierarchy would distract from the overall goals of the movement. The 
precedent of goals over organization and ideology, as I have mentioned, allows the 
movement to create a unified front.  
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The future political role Radi proposes for the movement defies easy 
categorization. It seems contradictory—it is concerned with politics, but is not a political 
party. It could be called a civil society organization, but how can such an organization be 
sustained without a guiding ideology? The best description may be that F20 would 
operate as a civil society organization and later develop an ideology that extrapolates 
from their demands. It could resemble the universal rights that Radi mentions without 
being placed on an ideological spectrum. The possibility of further repression leading to 
radicalization and violence, however, demonstrates that despite the successes of the 
movement, the state still exercises some control over the future of the movement. Radi 
presents the new logic of protests created by the paradigm of ISMs and extends it to a 




 The case on February 20th is not yet closed. A true conclusion on the topic must 
wait for years to determine the impact of this movement. Throughout this paper I have 
tried to connect the events of the movement to broader theories in order to provide a 
framework to analyze it. I have demonstrated how Morocco shows many of the 
characteristics of liberalized autocracy. It uses many of the strategies to maintain and 
centralize power: fragmented dissonant oppositional politics; strategic political reforms 
and openings; and claims to legitimacy both by representation of the people, tradition and 
religion; all of which pose real challenges to efforts towards full democracy. In lieu of the 
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emergence of an active political society with enough power to contest the monarchy’s a 
liberalized autocracy can maintain power indefinitely.  
Political opportunity, however, can come from outside of the regime’s sphere of 
influence. The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions provided an example to Moroccan 
activists, a threat to the monarchy and challenge the long-held notion of endemic Arab 
autocracy. This opening in the political sphere allow for the emergence of the February 
20th movement. This movement adapted the strategies of ISMs to Morocco’s reality. 
Social networking sites create “virtual public spheres” that allow free alternative 
information to reach a large audience. This creates a new consciousness, spurring the 
people to mobilize. The organization of the movement is highly decentralized, depending 
on local nodes called “coordinations.” The movement is united by goals that are spread 
through the Internet, eschewing any certain ideology. 
As of now, the February 20th movement has had some measurable success in 
challenging the Moroccan regime, though it has not succeeded in dismantling it. First, it 
has created the biggest grassroots mobilization in Morocco’s history. It has succeeded in 
uniting social movements across the political spectrum through their demands for a full 
democracy. Second, it has forced the monarchy to respond to their demands either 
directly or indirectly—the creation of a constitutional reform commission, the release of 
political prisoners, the raising of the minimum wage, the monarchy’s disengagement 
from SNI—addressing economic, social, human rights and corruption problems. There 
also have been responses in the political realm with the radicalization of parties. 
Additionally, with the emergence of the protest movement, there also has been an 
opening of the media in Moroccan society with traditional media becoming more critical 
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of the regime and online news sources gaining prominence. These changes all point to a 
creation of a fledgling active political society. 
It must be noted, however, that many of these changes may be part of the 
“unvirtuous circle” that Brumberg alluded to, they may be temporary openings of a 
regime under pressure. The constitutional commission is expected to follow the 
guidelines of reform set by the king, as will the other political parties, social and civil 
society organizations that are invited to contribute. The release of political prisoners, 
while significant, only constitutes a small portion of the population of prisoners thought 
to be unjustly held. Also, the unity achieved by the February 20th movement is tenuous at 
best and could fracture the movement prematurely. As of yet, the monarchy has not 
installed any major structural changes, or seceded any meaningful powers.  
Nevertheless, it appears that the February 20th movement may have a lasting 
impact on the balance of power in Morocco. As Langman notes, the decentralized 
organization of ISMs, their primary existence on the Internet and their broad, sweeping 
goals have meant that they live for an unusually long time. While this does not ensure 
any success, it does point to the potential for creating a new force within the politics of 
Morocco. Some of the more durable changes of the February 20th movement can be 
found on the Internet. Social networking tools, which seem to have installed themselves 
as part of the fabric of society, can double as a new public space for political discussion. 
The new media outlets such as Lakome.com and Mamfakinch.com could become online 
institutions that provide news, opinion and discussion outside of state control. Finally, the 
young organizers of February 20th have learned the important lessons of organizing, 
mobilizing and navigating the politics of protest.  
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These changes are admittedly ephemeral and vulnerable to suppression by the 
state. Though, while a liberalized autocracy has many repressive characteristics, it still 
derives it’s legitimacy from an appearance of freedom and democracy. On May 25, 2007 
the state-owned Maroc Telecom banned access to YouTube, allegedly because of some 
posting that were critical of the king and pro-Polisario. After a general outcry and 
condemnation by Human Rights Watch and other watchdog organizations, the site was 
back on. The Internet and a citizen’s unfettered access has become an unalienable right, 
and if the Moroccan state attempts to block it, it risks its legitimacy. The Internet 
combined with group of activists, may be able to lead to a change in the general 
consciousness of the Moroccan citizen. 
As of yet, there is no proof of a new mentality among Morocco, but there is 
sentiment of hope that can be gleaned from the interviews. Madani, Benjabli and Radi all 
pointed to a changing mentality in Moroccans as the most significant contribution of the 
February 20th movement. As Madani said, “you cannot control a generation.” While the 
movement may fracture, be co-opted by the state or simply fizzle, out the demands and 
its promises will remain in this generation’s consciousness. The February 20th movement 
has introduced a new form of social mobilization, a new unifying rhetoric for demands 
and a new imperative for change.  
 In closing, I will tell a small story. I took a late night train home from Marrakech 
to Rabat on the night of April 20th, exactly two months after the first protest. At one 
o’clock in the morning, the car was a mixture of sleeping passengers, teenagers glued to 
their computers, old women chatting among each other and a few men in the back singing 
and smoking cigarettes. The men came into the car, still lively and one asked loudly if 
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anyone was sleeping. If they were, it didn’t matter because he began to wax poetic on 
some subject of great importance. With my minimal Arabic, most of what he said is a 
mystery to me, but I could pick out some phrases “20th of February”, “King”, 
“constitution” and “democracy.” This sparked a conversation among his friends, with the 
car beginning to stir. Gradually, fellow passengers began to contribute each seemingly 
unable to resist. Then one older woman stood up, said “Excuse me, but…”, gave her 
opinion and the entire car entered into debate. What exactly was discussed that night, I 
don’t know. I got off at the next station. But this opening of public space into one of 
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